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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-4-11, Utah Code Annotated. (1953 as 
amended), and Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Whether or not the State established, by clear and convincing 
evidence, the Corpus Delicti of the crime charged, independently 
of the Defendant's admission to operating the motor vehicle in 
question, when evidence at trial indicated as follows: that the 
driver of the vehicle left his lane, crossed over the highway 
median strip, and rolled the vehicle; that the vehicle came to rest 
on the passenger side; that an unidentified man exited from the 
driver's window and fled the scene; that a second occupant of the 
vehicle received mortal injuries to the head; that the first 
persons on the scene found the injured occupant trapped underneath 
the passenger side of the vehicle and rolled the vehicle back to 
an upright position; that there was blood on the ground where the 
passenger window of the vehicle initially came to rest; that there 
was a strong odor of alcohol in the vehicle; and that open and 
closed beer cans were in the vehicle and strewn along the path 
where the vehicle rolled. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
A. Section 41-6-29, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
states as follows: 
1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident 
resulting in injury or death of any person shall 
immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident 
or as close to it as possible and shall immediately 
return to and remain at the scene until he has fulfilled 
the requirements of Section 41-6-31. The stop may not 
obstruct traffic more than is necessary. 
B. Section 41-2-136, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
states as follows: 
1) A person whose licence has been denied, suspended, 
disqualified, or revoked under this chapter or under the 
laws of the state in which his license was issued and who 
operates any motor vehicle upon the highways of the state 
while that licence is denied, suspended, disqualified, 
or revoked shall be punished as provided in this section. 
2) A person convicted of violation of Subsection 1), 
other than a violation specified in Subsection 3), is 
guilty of a class c. misdemeanor. 
3) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose 
conviction under subsection 1) is based on his operation 
a vehicle while his license is suspended, disqualified, 
or revoked for: 
i) a refusal to submit to a chemical test under 
Section 41-6-44.10; 
ii) a violation of Section 44-6-44. 
C. Section 41-6-63.10(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended) states as follows: 
2) A vehicle may not be operated over, across, or 
within any dividing space, median, or barrier of a 
divided highway, except where authorized by an official 
traffic-control device or peace officer. 
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NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The State hereby adopts and stipulates to the defendant's 
version of the Nature of the Proceedings as follows: 
Defendant appeals his conviction for a Class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of Section 41-6-29, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended), and for a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Section 
41-2-136, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). On November 15, 
1991, Defendant was committed to serve 30 days in jail due to his 
conviction of the above charges. On November 21, 1991, Defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial. The trial court issued an unsigned 
minute entry granting the motion and ordering the guilty verdict 
set aside. On January 30, 1992, the court found the Defendant 
guilty on both counts. On March 26, 1992, Defendant appeared for 
sentencing, and the court sentenced the Defendant in an unsigned 
order. On May 6, 1992, the court held a hearing to review the 
sentence and stayed sentence for thirty days in case Defendant 
wanted to appeal. The Defendant filed his notice to appeal on May 
8, 1992. Because the unsigned minute order did not constitute a 
final order, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on 
September 15, 1992. A second notice of appeal was filed on 
November 9, 1992. 
Trial in this case was held on January 30, 1992. At the 
conclusion of the state's evidence, the Defendant moved for a 
dismissal of both counts, arguing that the State had not met its 
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burden to establish the corpus delicti of the crimes by 
independent, clear and convincing evidence prior to admitting the 
Defendant's confession. The Defendant had previously briefed the 
court on the corpus delicti issue. The court denied the 
Defendant's motion to dismiss and ruled that there was sufficient 
corroborating evidence to allow the Defendant's confession and the 
corroborating evidence could be taken together to establish the 
corpus delicti of the crime, thereby allowing the confession to be 
used for the further purpose of establishing identity of the 
criminal agent. The Defendant then notified the court of his 
intent to appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State hereby adopts and stipulates to the Defendant's 
Statement of the Case as follows: 
Mr. Hansen was tried and convicted at bench trial on January 
30, 1992, of leaving the scene of an injury accident and driving 
with a suspended license. Independent of Mr. Hansen's confession, 
.... evidence presented by the State showed that a single car 
rollover occurred on 1-15 on September 7, 1991, that the car came 
to rest on the passenger side of the car, that the only available 
exit from the car was the driver's door, that an unidentified man 
in a blue jacket and red shirt was seen climbing up and out of that 
door, and that no witnesses could testify as to whether the man was 
the operator or the passenger. The same man went to a nearby grove 
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of trees, then recrossed the highway and hitchhiked north. There 
was a second occupant in the car at the time of the accident and 
he was thrown from the vehicle and received mortal injuries to the 
head. 
Approximately 25 hours later police arrested David Laird 
Hansen, who was wearing clothes similar to those described by 
witnesses on the day before. The State's witness did not identify 
Mr. Hansen as the person who exited the vehicle, beyond a general 
description of his clothing and the fact that he had a small cut 
on his hand. Mr. Hansen was arrested after a car in which he was 
a passenger was pulled over on 1-15 more than 24 hours after the 
accident. During the subsequent questioning by police, Mr. Hansen 
stated that he had been driving the car at the time of the 
accident. 
In addition to the foregoing facts as set forth in the 
Defendant's brief, the State established the following facts, 
independently of the Defendant's confessions: The driver of the 
vehicle left his lane, crossed completely over the 1-15 median 
strip, and rolled the vehicle (See p. 5 line 13, through p. 6 line 
9; and p. 36 lines 1-6, of the Trial Transcript); the first persons 
to arrive at the scene of the accident found the injured occupant 
trapped underneath the passenger side of the vehicle and rolled the 
vehicle back to an upright position, and blood was found on the 
ground where the passenger window of the vehicle initially came to 
rest (See p. 8 line 25, through p. 9 line 7; and p. 38 line 11, 
through p. 39 line 11, of the Trial Transcript); there was a strong 
5 
odor of alcohol in the vehicle, and there were open and closed beer 
cans in the vehicle and strewn along the path where the vehicle 
rolled (See p. 10 lines 5-7; and p. 39 lines 5-7, of the Trial 
Transcript); on September 7, 1991, the Defendant's driver's 
licence was suspended for previous alcohol violations. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Corpus Delicti rule requires that the State establish, by 
clear and convincing evidence independent of the Defendant's 
confession, that an injury occurred, and that such injury was 
caused by someone's criminal conduct. 
One basis for sufficiency of the State's evidence under the 
Corpus Delicti rule in this case is that there was an accident with 
a mortally injured occupant of the vehicle. The criminal agency 
which caused that injury was the illegal crossing of a median strip 
by the driver of the vehicle. 
Another basis for the sufficiency of the State's evidence 
under the Corpus Delicti rule in this case requires that the State 
establish criminality_where one of the vehicle's occupants fled the 
scene of the accident and left his mortally injured companion. 
Criminality in that situation, of course, requires the State to 
establish that the person who fled the scene was the driver of the 
vehicle. Otherwise, there would have been no crime in fleeing the 
scene. 
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The State has established, by clear and convincing evidence 
independent of the Defendant's confession, that 1) a person was 
mortally injured in an accident, a cause of which was the illegal 
act of crossing a highway median by the driver, whoever it was; 
and 2) that the driver of the vehicle fled the scene immediately 
after the accident, leaving the vehicle and the mortally injured 
passenger. 
Under either one of those two factual scenarios, the State has 
established the corpus delicti necessary for the allowance of the 
Defendants confessions into evidence at trial. 
ARGUMENT 
The State did establish at trial, by clear and convincing 
evidence, the corpus delicti of the crimes committed, independently 
of the Defendant's confessions. The independent evidence indicates 
that a wrong or injury was committed, and that the wrong or injury 
was caused by a criminal agency. 
In State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1992), the 
corpus delicti rule is defined as follows: 
"The corpus delicti rule states that before a defendant's 
inculpatory statements can be introduced as evidence against 
the defendant, the State must prove the occurrence of a crime, 
i.e., a corpus delicti... (citations omitted) The rule is 
designed as a 'safeguard against convicting the innocent on 
the strength of false confessions.'" (citations omitted) 
The Johnson Court then goes on to set forth the elements of 
the corpus delicti rule: 
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"Corpus delicti must be established through evidence 
independent of the confession or admission, that 'the injuries 
specified... occurred, and that such injury was caused by 
someone's criminal conduct.'11 (citations omitted) (Id.) 
The Johnson Court restated those elements as requirements of 
previous cases. "Our past cases have consistently required that 
the independent evidence show two things: 1) 'that a wrong, and 
injury, or a damage has been done,' and 2) 'that such was effected 
by a criminal agency, i.e., without right or by unlawful means.'" 
(citations omitted) (Id.) 
Independent of the defendant's confession, the State offered 
evidence, certainly reaching the clear and convincing standard 
required under Johnson (See Id. at 1163), as to every element of 
the charges except, perhaps, for the identification of the 
Defendant as the criminal actor. However, proof of identification 
is not required to establish a corpus delicti. Johnson states that 
"under our prior cases the State is not required to show 
independent evidence 'that the accused is the guilty agent.'" 
(citations omitted) (Id. at 1162). 
In Defendant's brief, counsel seems to argue that the State 
must establish, by clear and convincing evidence independent of the 
Defendant's confession, every element of the crimes charged. This, 
however, does not comport with the corpus delicti requirements of 
Johnson as set forth above. The State need only establish that 
there was an injury, and that the injury was caused by someone's 
criminal conduct. 
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The injury in this case could be either the mortal injury 
received by the one occupant of the vehicle, or the leaving of the 
mortally injured man by the other occupant. The criminal conduct 
which was a cause of the mortal injury, would be the illegal 
crossing of the highway median by the driver, whoever it was, as 
prohibited in Section 41-6-63.10(2), Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
Amended). Though such criminal conduct does seem a bit removed 
from the crimes actually charged, it very well could have been 
charged. Furthermore, such conduct arose out of the same incident 
which formed the factual basis for the charges which were brought. 
And in order to obtain a conviction for the illegal operation of 
a vehicle in the median, and for a conviction of the other crimes 
actually charged, a common required element the State would need 
to establish for each of those crimes, would be the identification 
of the Defendant as the driver. Thus, if the State has established 
at trial a corpus delicti for any one of those factually related 
crimes, it should be allowed to use the Defendant's confession as 
evidence to establish elements for all of those crimes. After all, 
the corpus delicti cases require only proof of the occurrence of 
"a" crime. (See Johnson at 1162) And where the crimes arise out 
of the same incident, there is little danger of conviction upon a 
false confession. 
The criminal conduct involved in leaving the scene of an 
accident which involves a mortal injury is, of course, obvious; 
providing that the person leaving the scene was the driver. And 
to establish a corpus delicti under this particular injury— 
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criminal conduct scenario, the State concedes that the there must 
be a showing by clear and convincing evidence, independent of the 
Defendant's confession, that the person who left the scene of the 
accident was the driver. That is because if it was the driver who 
was mortally injured, and it was the passenger who left the scene, 
there is no crime for which the passenger could be convicted. And 
thus, the criminal connection to the injury could not be 
established. 
The State's evidence in this case, however, sufficiently 
establishes that the person who left the scene of the accident was 
the driver. The evidence indicates that the vehicle rolled and 
came to rest on the passenger side, that the injured person was 
trapped underneath the passenger side and had received mortal 
injuries to the head, that blood was found where the passenger 
window of the vehicle came to rest, and that the other occupant of 
the vehicle exited from the driver's window shortly after the 
accident. All of this evidence indicates that the person who 
exited the vehicle was the driver. Additionally, the evidence 
shows that the person who exited the vehicle fled the scene, that 
there was an odor of alcohol in the vehicle, and that beer cans 
were scattered in the vehicle and strewn along the path of the 
vehicle as it rolled. A reasonable factual inference can be drawn 
from those facts that the person exiting the vehicle was the 
driver. That is because if he were a passenger, neither he, nor 
any reasonable person under the same circumstances, would have a 
compelling reason to flee the scene. Whereas if he were the 
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driver, the presence of the alcohol, together with his operation 
of the vehicle, the occurrence of an accident, and the resulting 
mortal injury to the passenger, would give him a very strong motive 
to flee the scene. 
As for establishing the corpus delicti for the Driving on 
Suspension charge, it is the State's position, as set forth above, 
that if a corpus delicti is established for any crime at trial, the 
Defendant's testimony may be used at such trial to establish the 
elements of any other crime which arises out of the same incident 
as the crime for which a corpus delicti has been established. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests that 
this Court affirm the Trial Court's conviction of the Defendant in 
this matter. 
A 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this If) dav of March, 1993. 
Benjamin/T. Davis 
Deputy i6tah County Attorney 
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